











Abstract	Public	 Private	 Partnerships	 (PPPs)	 in	 many	 cases	 supplement	 or	 replace	 the	 „traditional“	governmental	responsibility	to	provide	and/or	produce	public	services	and	infrastructure.	These	cooperation	 models	 are	 characterized	 by	 potentials	 for	 a	 –	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 –	improvement	due	to	increased	efficiency,	but	also	by	shortcomings	as	their	specific	vulnerability	for	corruption.	This	article	conceptualizes	the	vulnerability	of	PPPs	for	corruption	–	a	threat	that	is	amplified	by	the	 multi-level	 characteristics	 of	 PPPs,	 the	 incomplete	 contract	 they	 are	 based	 on,	 and	 the	underlying	life-cycle	concept	–	and	provides	some	approaches	how	this	problem	may	be	overcome	by	measures	on	the	political	or	administrative	level.	
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I. Introduction	Cooperations	 between	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 private	 enterprises,	 so-called	 Public	 Private	Partnerships	 (PPPs),	have	some	historical	pedigree	supplementing	or	replacing	 the	 „traditional“	governmental	responsibility	to	provide	and/or	produce	services	of	general	economic	interest,	 in	particular	in	infrastructure	–	water	and	sanitation,	prisons,	or	schools.	These	cooperation	models,	being	 very	 different	 in	 design	 and	 form,	 in	 general	 have	 to	 balance	 between	 the	 managerial	autonomy	of	the	private	partner	and	democratic	accountability	of	the	public	body	involved.	They	are	characterized	by	horizontal	relations	and	shared	responsibilities	between	the	partners	(Hodge	2006,	Mörth	2009).	They	therewith	epitomize	the	fact	that	the	cutting	lines	between	the	public	and	private	sphere	are	blurring	and	have	to	be	re-evaluated.	Overall,	PPPs	are	designed	to	raise	potentials	for	a	–	quantitative	and	qualitative	–	improvement	of	public	 services	due	 to	enhanced	 financial,	managerial	or	 technical	 efficiency	 (Klitgaard	2012;		Kwak,	Chih,	and	Ibbs	2009).	Having	an	“iconic	status	around	the	world”	(Hodge	and	Greve	2010,	p.	8),	they	are	often	viewed	as	a	sophisticated	and	professional	alternative	for	modern	infrastructure	management.	This	promise	as	well	as	optimism	from	PPP	advocates	 in	many	cases	did	not	 fully	realize.	 The	 reasons	 can	 be	 endogeneous	 to	 the	 design	 of	 a	 single	 project,	 or	 more	 general	exogeneous	 factors	 in	 the	execution	process	of	PPPs	 (for	examples	e.g.	Hodge	and	Greve	2007).	Several	weaknesses	could	be	mentioned	here,	as	e.g.	deal	complexity,	the	need	for	long-term	equity	or	problems	related	to	the	calculation	of	public	sector	costs	(Hodge	2006).		Even	if	the	process	of	PPP	implementation	and	execution	seems	to	be	comparable	to	agreements	on	 other	 forms	 of	 shared	 responsibilities	 between	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 sector,	 there	 are	relevant	differences,	in	particular	regarding	contract	duration	and	design	as	well	as	the	composition	of	 actors	 involved.	 These	 characteristics	 of	 PPPs,	 so	 our	 hypothesis,	 may	 make	 them	 also	particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 corruption,	 even	 if	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 literature	 refers	 to	 the	 general	control-effect	of	private	sector	inclusion	(e.g.	Sclar	2000).	Hence,	this	article	conceptualizes	from	a	theoretical	viewpoint	the	vulnerability	of	PPP	models	for	corruption	against	the	backdrop	of	contract	theory,	principal-agent	theory	and	transaction	cost	economics.	Despite	 some	of	 the	 „channels“	 for	 corruption	 in	 PPPs	 resemble	 the	 ones	 regarding	other	forms	public-private	collaboration,	due	to	the	characteristics	of	PPPs,	there	are	specific	points	that	have	to	be	highlighted	(Klitgaard	2012).	The	assumed	(higher)	vulnerability	for	corruption	is	induced	by	the	multi-level	characteristics	of	PPPs,	the	incomplete	contract	they	are	based	on,	and	the	underlying	life-cycle	concept,	including	long-term	relations	and	„repeated	games“.	Our	contribution	to	the	ongoing	debate	on	the	use	of	PPPs	therewith	is	twofold:	first,	an	issue	more	or	 less	neglected	by	 the	pertinent	 literature	 is	analyzed	 theoretically.	 Second,	 tackling	 the	
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question	of	the	origins	of	corruption	in	PPPs	is	all	the	more	relevant	as	these	instruments	are	used	not	only	in	developed	countries	whose	legal	order	may	shield	PPPs	sufficiently	against	corruption,	but	also	in	developing	countries	and	emerging	markets	that	do	not	provide	these	legal	instruments.	Hence,	 carving	 out	 the	 vulnerable	 points	 in	 PPP	 arrangements	 may	 not	 only	 rise	 awareness	regarding	 this	 problem,	 but	 also	 may	 enable	 decision	 makers	 to	 install	 appropriate	 control	mechanisms,	if	need	be	on	project	level.		
II.	Public	Private	Partnerships	as	new	Instruments	of	Service	Provision	Budgetary	 restraints	 and	 the	 pressure	 on	 public	 goods,	 particularly	 on	 existing	 network	infrastructures	led	to	a	redefinition	of	the	private	and	the	public	sphere	and	responsibilities	in	many	countries.	Private	investment,	or,	more	general,	private	sector	inclusion,	is	discussed	as	a	potential	solution	for	the	altering	challenges	of	the	public	sector.	This	inclusion	can	take	place	in	different	guises	–	as	full	or	partial	privatization,	or	as	joint	projects	in	the	form	of	public	private	partnerships	(PPPs)	between	the	public	administration	and	private	firms	that	ensure	adequate	control	rights	for	the	public	 sector	over	 the	 crucial	 aspects	of	 service	provision	 (Demuijnck	and	Ngnodjom	2011;	Marques	and	Berg	2011).	PPPs	constitute	an	“alternative	to	contracting	out	and	privatization,	and	thus	they	are	seen	as	a	qualitative	jump	ahead	in	the	effort	to	combine	the	strong	sides	of	the	public	sector	and	the	private	sector”	(Hodge	and	Greve	2007,	p.	545).	They	also	provide	an	opportunity	in	the	sense	of	“entrepreneurial	government	movement”	(Bloomfield	2006),	as	they	do	not	only	rely	on	 private	 resources,	 but	 also	market-oriented	 strategies	with	 regards	 e.g.	 on	 competition	 and	performance	contracting.	Generally	spoken,	the	implicit	assumption	of	a	better	value	for	money	in	PPPs	is	derived	from	the	neo-classical	view	of	markets	under	perfect	information,	even	if	empirical	evidence	for	their	superior	performance	remains	limited	(Hodge	and	Greve	2007;	Reeves	2008).	Focusing	on	the	opportunities	of	this	form	of	cooperation,	PPPs	have	some	historical	pedigree,	in	particular	in	the	US.	Within	the	EU	multi-level	system	of	the	European	Union,	the	PPP	approach	was	implemented	at	least	with	the	„EU	Green	Paper“	from	2004.	Additionally,	national	initiatives	in	the	 individual	member	 states	 target	 sustainable	 cooperations	with	 the	private	 sector	–	 in	 some	cases	 in	 the	 form	 of	 gold-plating,	 implementing	 even	 stronger	 incentives	 to	 use	 PPPs	 in	infrastructure	 and	 service	 provision.	 These	 initiatives	 demonstrate	 the	 political	 will	 to	 use	 the	instrument	of	PPPs	in	a	more	systematic	way	on	the	European	level	as	well	as	in	most	EU	member	countries;	similar	initiatives,	task	forces	or	PPP	laws	exist	in	most	countries	worldwide.		Despite	this	increased	attractiveness,	the	theoretical	analysis	of	these	„new“	partnership	models	remains	 poor.	 Moreover,	 the	 term	 “PPP”	 itself	 is	 still	 lacking	 a	 precise,	 widely	 acknowledged	definition	 (Budäus	and	Grüb	2007;	Hodge	2006).	They	are	neither	hierarchies	nor	markets,	but	something	in	between	–	relational	arrangements	based	on	contracts,	but	also	on	trust	and	(long-term)	commitment	(Mörth	2009).	Hierarchy	is	replaced,	and	only	a	limited	delegation	of	authority	between	 the	 partners	 is	 given,	 raising	 questions	 regarding	 accountability	 (Behn	 2001;	 Koenig-Archibugi	2004).	These	characteristics	constitute	a	relevant	distinction	against	other	contractual	arrangements	in	infrastructure	provision	(see	e.g.	Savas	2000).	The	prevalent	PPP	definitions	 typically	 focus	either	on	the	players	 involved	or	on	procedural	aspects	of	these	partnerships.	Bloomfield	(2006)	defines	PPPs	as	complex,	long-term	contracts	that	provide	a	combination	of	services,	construction,	or	financing	in	return	for	access	to	public	funds	or	user	fees.	In	quite	a	similar	vein,	but	focusing	on	infrastructures	only,	Grimsey	and	Lewis	(2005)	define	 PPPs	 as	 arrangements	 whereby	 private	 enterprises	 participate	 in	 the	 provision	 of	infrastructure.	 Marques	 and	 Berg	 (2011)	 see	 PPP	 as	 “a	 form	 of	 public	 procurement	 with	cooperation	between	a	public	authority	and	a	private	partner”	(Marques	and	Berg	2011).	Linder	(1999)	broadly	defines	the	term	PPP	as	“rubric	for	describing	cooperative	ventures	between	the	state	 and	 private	 business”,	 while	 Hodge	 and	 Greve	 (2007)	 perceive	 “cooperative	 institutional	arrangements	between	public	and	private	sector	actors”	as	PPPs.	To	sum	up,	the	decisive	factor	of	a	PPP	is	the	interest	of	both	partners	involved,	and	not	the	specific	sector,	as	the	general	concept	can	be	applied	to	almost	all	sectors	of	public	service	provision.		Based	on	this	approach,	PPPs	in	the	sense	of	our	study	are	contractual	agreements	between	at	least	one	private	enterprise	and	the	public	sector	that	comprise	more	than	one	value-added	step	or	level	of	the	respective	project.	At	least	two	value-added	steps,	i.e.	planning/project	development,	
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construction,	 management,	 operation	 and	maintenance,	 as	 well	 as	 reconstruction	 (or	 removal)	have	to	be	consolidated	within	a	project	to	fit	this	definition.	This	multi-step	approach	of	PPPs,	an	equivalent	to	traditional	bundling	of	tasks	at	the	government’s	site,	is	the	most	relevant	distinction	versus	 other	 forms	 of	 public	 cooperation	 with	 the	 private	 sector,	 e.g.	 outsourcing/public	procurement.	Moreover,	in	each	PPP,	some	control	rights	remain	with	the	public	partner,	while	the	private	 company	 enjoys	 some	 leeway	 to	 generate	 cash	 flow.	 Consequently,	 a	 complete	material	privatization	cannot	be	classified	as	PPP.	While	in	the	case	of	institutionalized	PPPs	an	independent	legal	entity,	a	mixed	company,	is	created,	in	the	contractual	PPPs	we	focus	on,	a	(long-term)	contract	between	the	two	parties	is	established	(Budäus	und	Grüb	2007;	Marques	and	Berg	2011).	While	the	former	 cooperation	 form	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 pooling	 of	 the	 resources	 within	 one	 new	organization,	the	latter	one	is	a	terminated	agreement	with	the	public	sector	being	the	constituent,	the	private	company	being	the	contractor	–	a	risk-sharing	arrangement	with	the	private	partner	taking	over	(at	least	some)	financial	responsibility	(Budäus	und	Grüb	2007).		The	 duration	 of	 PPP	 projects	 varies	 between	 one	 and	 thirty	 years,	 with	 mere	 service	 and	management	contracts	being	of	relatively	short-term	duration,	while	PPP	designs	which	include	the	construction	of	an	asset	and	that	are	refinanced	by	user	fees	are	usually	based	on	longer	contract	durations.	In	particular,	long-term	PPPs,	which	may	involve	several	generations	of	civil	servants,	but	 also	 private	managers	 and	 citizens,	 receive	 specific	 attention,	 as	 the	 concept	 of	 action	 and	liability	may	be	affected	in	these	cases	(Bloomfield	2006).	The	commercial	risk	of	failure	is	mainly	borne	by	the	public	sector	in	(short-term)	projects	that	do	not	affect	the	ownership	of	the	asset	(which	remains	with	the	public	sector).	In	PPPs	where	a	direct	contact	between	the	private	company	and	the	customer/user	exists	(i.e.	concessions	and	the	Build-Operate-Transfer/Build-Own-Operate/Build-Own-Operate-Transfer	 PPP	 variants),	 the	private	partner	has	to	shoulder	the	main	or	at	least	a	high	portion	of	the	commercial	risk	(Iossa	and	Martimort	 2014).	 This	 is	 caused	 by	 potentially	 insufficient	 revenues	 relative	 to	 its	 costs	 (high	upfront	 costs	must	be	 refinanced	over	 extended	periods	of	 time),	while	protection	mechanisms	designed	to	reduce	the	commercial	risk	to	the	private	company	by	guaranteeing	a	fixed	or	minimum	revenue	stream	are	not	always	in	place.	Generally,	the	number	of	contingencies	regulated	by	the	respective	contract	differs	amongst	countries	and	sectors,	respectively	(Iossa	and	Martimort	2014).	Hence,	even	if	the	commercial	risk	can	be	fixed	in	the	contract,	in	particular	in	developing	countries	proper	enforcement	mechanisms	are	often	missing,	or	the	inclusion	of	such	clauses	depends	on	the	bargaining	power	of	the	private	firm	that	may	be	limited.	The	 expectations	 and	 interest	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 incentives	 –	 related	 to	 the	 socio-economic	outcomes	of	PPPs	differ	substantially	among	participants	and	stakeholders.	Nonetheless,	valuing	PPPs	 as	 cooperations	 does	 not	 cannibalize	 their	 contractual	 nature	 that	 is	 based	 on	 different	interest.	As	Markovits	(2004)	argues,	“promises	generally,	and	contracts	in	particular,	establish	a	relation	of	recognition	and	respect	–	and	indeed	a	kind	of	community	–	among	those	who	participate	in	 them	 […]	 even	 though	 contracts	 typically	 arise	 among	 self-interested	 parties	 who	 aim	 to	appropriate	as	much	of	the	value	that	contracts	create	as	they	can”	(Markovits	2004).	The	 public	 partner	 focuses	 on	 its	 need	 to	 procure	 additional	 capital	 as	 well	 as	 to	 attract	managerial	 competences	 and	 technical	 skills	 –	 which	 are	 of	 special	 relevance	 in	 the	 case	 of	technologically	 complex	 infrastructures	 like	 water	 supply,	 sewage	 systems,	 energy,	 and	telecommunications	–	without	losing	the	political	control	over	infrastructure	provision.	Even	if	the	evidence	 of	 higher	 efficiency	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 not	 unquestioned	 in	 literature,	 in	 fact	 the	private	company	may	be	more	accountable	to	its	customers	and	to	the	public	partner	due	to	the	existence	 of	 a	 contract	 that	 defines	 duties	 and	 potential	 penalties,	 and	 the	 service	 delivery	 is	expected	 to	be	better	 (Marques	 and	Berg	2011).	Additionally,	 as	many	 forms	of	PPPs	allow	 the	financing	 of	 the	 public	 infrastructure	 as	 off	 -budget	 or	 off	 -balance-sheet,	 at	 least	 the	 public	perception	is	given	that	these	models	avoid	new	debt	(Bloomfield	2006;	EPEC	2014).	This	fact	may	be	more	 relevant	 for	 the	 political	 level	 that	 decides	whether	 PPPs	 are	 principally	 an	 option	 of	service	provision,	less	important	for	the	administration.		As	for	the	administrative	level,	the	expectations	regarding	to	the	implementation	of	PPPs	may	differ.	Beyond	the	expected	benefits	–	which	in	the	long	term	also	may	enlarge	the	leeway	of	the	
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administration	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 Niskanen	 (1971)	 –	 there	 are	 at	 least	 short-term	 restrictions	 or	inconveniences	 arising	 from	PPPs.	The	 administrative	 level	 has	 to	 cope	with	new	 (prospective)	partners,	most	likely	new	legal	regulations	for	tendering	the	PPP,	and	possibly	the	public	that	has	a	stake	in	the	respective	project.	An	increased	workload	or	the	necessity	of	further	training	may	be	the	consequence	–	 in	particular	 for	smaller	administrative	bodies	a	challenge	that	 is	not	easy	to	manage.	 The	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 the	 public	 partner	 may	 have	 a	 homogeneous	 interest	therefore	has	to	be	questioned.	This	fact	becomes	relevant	in	the	context	of	corrupt	behavior,	as	the	drawbacks	coming	from	PPPs	may	increase	the	single	civil	servant’s	impulse	to	be	open	towards	bribes	and	corruption.	In	 contrast,	 the	 private	 company	 is	 driven	 by	 profit	 motives	 (Reeves	 2008).	 In	 addition	 to	maximizing	its	profit	in	the	specific	projects	at	stake,	the	private	partner	typically	pursues	a	long-term,	strategic	goal,	too.	By	committing	to	a	specific	PPP	in	a	specific	country,	the	enterprise	gains	at	 least	 indirect	 access	 to	 a	 market	 which	 may	 not	 be	 open	 for	 full	 privatization	 (yet).	 This	investment,	 in	turn,	may	be	a	potential	 first-mover	advantage	in	the	eventuality	of	a	subsequent	privatization	(provided,	of	course,	that	the	company	has	gained	a	reputation	as	a	dependable	and	fair	partner	during	the	PPP	period).	Moreover,	experience	and	expertise	in	one	country	as	a	PPP	partner	may	 increase	 the	 likelihood	of	winning	 future	 tenders	 for	 similar	PPP	projects	 in	other	contexts,	which	is	of	interest	in	particular	for	multinational	enterprises.	Furthermore,	with	the	related	concepts	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	and	stakeholder	activism	becoming	more	and	more	relevant	for	multinational	companies	(at	least	for	those	which	are	 headquartered	 in	 Western-style	 democracies	 with	 free	 media),	 in	 some	 special	 cases	 the	decision	to	enter	into	a	PPP	project	may	not	exclusively	follow	a	short-term	profit	maximization	motive	(narrowly	defined).	It	may	rather	be	intended	as	a	signal	of	a	high(er)	degree	of	stakeholder	orientation	to	customers,	the	public,	the	media,	governments	and	NGOs	from	all	countries	where	the	 company	 is	 doing	 business.	 In	 other	 words,	 under	 such	 circumstances	 a	 PPP	 activity	 may	convince	the	public	partner	of	the	company’s	goodwill	and	may	accordingly	influence	it	to	consider	the	company	the	government’s	preferred	partner	in	future	(case-by-case)	decisions	on	upcoming	PPP	projects	or	privatization	programs	–	thereby	giving	rise	to	another	first-mover	advantage	by	raising	potential	rivals’	costs	of	market	entry.		
ІІІ.	Corruption	in	Partnership	Regimes	
1. Corruption	–	Definition	and	Main	Variants		With	a	view	to	the	broad	range	of	actions	and	measures	that	can	be	classified	as	„corruption“	–	whether	in	the	scientific	or	the	public	debate	–,	the	phenomenon	of	corruption	can	be	captured	in	its	 entirety	 only	 by	 an	 interdisciplinary	 approach	 (von	 Arnim	 et	 al.	 2006).	 Beyond	 the	 legal	definition	of	corruption,	which	differs	amongst	countries,	other	approaches	that	may	be	of	interest	here	are	political,	socio-economic	or	more	philosophical	perspectives	on	this	topic	(see	e.g.	Caiden	and	Caiden	1977).	As	the	constituent	factor	of	corruption	in	our	definition,	the	–	mostly	clandestine	–	use	of	assigned	power	for	private	gains	clearly	stands	out,	whether	by	government	officials	or	other	individuals	(von	Arnim	et	al.	2006).	This	fact	is	even	more	relevant	as	–	in	the	context	of	the	economic	 theory	 of	 new	 institutional	 economics–	 in	 all	 cases	 of	 assigned	 power	 some	 kind	 of	principal-agent-relationship	exists.	A	principal,	who	delegates	power,	and	an	agent,	who	wields	that	power,	but	whose	actions	cannot	be	supervised	by	the	principal,	characterize	such	a	situation	in	which	corruption	is	likely	to	occur.	This	is	true	even	though	not	all	kinds	of	violations	of	obligations	that	occur	due	to	principal-agent-problems	can	be	characterized	as	corruption.		Following	this	definition,	corruption	may	occur	in	the	private	as	well	as	in	the	public	sphere.	As	a	multi-level	agency	problem,	it	can	also	occur	at	all	levels	of	the	state	simultaneously	–	i.e.	between	the	voting	population,	politicians	and	bureaucrats	–	and	 is	by	no	means	 restricted	 to	 the	public	administration	 (Puwein	 et	 al.	 2004).	 The	 implicit	 assumption	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 societal	 consent	regarding	the	acceptable	set	of	actions,	and	a	clear-cut	understanding	of	where	misuse	of	authority	or	assigned	power	starts	(Caiden	and	Caiden	1977).		This	definition	covers	a	broad	range	of	actions,	independent	from	the	question	if,	or	if	not,	the	individual	act	of	corruption	 is	 liable	 to	prosecution	 in	a	specific	context.	This	broad	approach	 is	necessary	as	the	legislation	as	well	as	the	general	attitude	towards	corruption	differs	substantially	
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across	countries:	while	in	most	countries	worldwide	bribery	is	illegal,	prosecution	schemes	differ,	and	so	does	the	perception	of	unethical	behavior.	Hence,	even	if	a	specific	act	–	e.g.	the	distortion	of	the	 tendering	process	 in	 favor	 of	 an	 enterprise	 the	 public	 official	may	be	 linked	 to	 –	 is	 socially	accepted,	 it	 causes	 the	 negative	 effects	 associated	 to	 corruption.	 Accordingly,	 also	 non-criminal	actions	as	nepotism	could	be	understood	as	corruption	in	the	sense	of	this	study,	as	long	as	they	lead	to	unfavorable	outcomes	in	terms	of	inefficient	allocation	of	bids,	inefficient	service	delivery	or	increased	cost	levels	for	the	public	sector.		Moreover,	corruption	often	can	occur	as	network	corruption	in	the	sense	that	a	relatively	closed	social	network	benefits	from	the	corrupt	practice,	not	only	a	single	individual.	Actions	that	–	directly	or	indirectly	–	improve	one’s	position	within	the	social	network	are	undertaken	(von	Arnim	et	al.	2006).	 Here,	 often	 a	 time	 lag	 exists	 between	 the	 corrupt	 practice	 and	 the	 benefit	 from	 it:	 The	investment	occurs	at	t1,	while	the	return	on	investment	(RoI)	occurs	in	t1	or	t2	or	even	later	(Priddat	2005).		
2. Are	PPPs	particularly	corruption-prone?	Within	 the	 last	decades,	 a	branch	of	 literature	emerged	which	 focuses	both	 theoretically	and	empirically	on	the	origins	and	consequences	of	corruption	(for	an	overview	see	Graf	Lambsdorff	2006;	Mauro	1995;	von	Arnim	et	al.	2006).	As	corruption	mostly	occurs	“in	the	shadow”	–	though	not	necessarily	in	the	shadow	economy,	but	without	being	discovered	and	statistically	recorded	–,	a	quantification	of	corruption	and	its	consequences	is	not	easy	to	perform	(von	Arnim	et	al.	2006).	This	is	even	more	relevant	with	a	view	to	corruption	within	PPPs.		In	general,	corruption	arises	at	the	interface	of	business	and	the	political	sphere	–	exactly	the	point	where	PPPs	are	located	(Priddat	2005).	Based	on	insights	from	principal-agent	theory	and	contract	theory	the	vulnerability	for	corruption	in	PPPs	can	be	grounded	on	three	characteristics:	the	 very	 incomplete	 and	 somewhat	discretionarily	decided	 contract	with	high	 transaction	 costs	they	are	based	on,	the	multi-level	characteristics	of	implementation	and	execution,	as	well	as	the	underlying	 multi-step	 or	 life-cycle	 concept.	 This	 vulnerability	 may	 realize	 in	 different	 specific	channels	for	bribery	and	render	them	more	corruption-prone	than	other	contractual	agreements	or	collaborations	between	the	private	and	the	public	sector	(Hemming	2006;	Iossa	and	Martimort	2014;	Klitgaard	2012).	Incentives	as	well	as	possibilities	to	become	corrupt	are	induced	by	these	characteristics,	so	our	assumption.	In	the	following,	we	conceptualize	the	channels	through	which	corruption	can	take	place	in	the	context	of	PPPs,	and	outline	some	counter-strategies	that	may	help	to	insulate	these	cooperation	regimes	against	corruption.	Assuming	that	individuals	have	no	implicit	preference	towards	more	or	less	corrupt	behavior,	their	decision	will	depend	on	the	incentive	in	a	specific	situation	and	the	expected	costs	–	including	transaction	costs	–	and	benefits	from	their	decision.	Consequently,	for	both	sides	–	the	briber	and	the	bribee	–	corruption	can	be	modelled	as	a	revenue	function.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that	the	private	side	has	an	incentive	to	bribe	the	public	servant	(not	vice	versa).	While	the	decision	to	implement	 a	 partnership	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 is	 a	 political	 one	 (pre-tender	 decision),	 the	tendering	and	execution	process	itself	is	guided	by	the	administrative	level	(ex	ante	as	well	as	ex	post	 to	 the	 project	 execution).	 Hence,	 we	 can	 assume	 that	 in	 most	 cases	 the	 receptor	 side	 for	corruption	will	be	on	the	public	side:	The	political	level	may	be	the	subject	of	bribery	in	the	pre-tendering	phase,	with	enterprises	 trying	 to	 influence	politicians	 to	open	up	sectors	 for	PPPs,	or	more	 concretely,	 to	 turn	 a	 single	 project	 into	 a	 PPP.	 The	 administrative	 level	will	 be	 the	 target	whenever	a	private	enterprise	strives	for	becoming	part	of	a	newly	established	PPP,	as	the	public	administration	allocates	 the	 right	 (which	 is	often	a	monopoly)	of	 serving	 the	market.	The	 same	applies	to	corruption	in	the	execution	phase	of	the	project	or	after	completion	(in	the	context	of	re-negotiations	or	contract	renewal).	For	 the	politician	 as	well	 as	 public	 servant,	 the	decision	 to	 become	 corrupt	 can	be	modelled	similarly.	The	bureaucrat	is	likely	to	accept	bribes	or	other,	non-monetary	benefits	if	the	expected	benefit/revenue	(that	may	be	higher	or	lower	than	the	costs	of	corruption	of	the	private	partner	and	may	be	subject	 to	discounting	 if	 the	pay-off	 is	 in	 the	 future,	e.g.	a	position	 in	 the	board	of	a	private	 company	 for	 a	 politician)	 are	 higher	 than	 the	 expected	 penalty	 or	 opportunity	 costs	(dismissal	or	loss	of	pension)	times	the	probability	of	being	caught.		
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For	the	briber,	the	private	enterprise,	the	revenue	stems	from	the	cash	flow	of	the	project	–	may	it	be	the	direct	payment	by	the	public	sector,	user	fees,	or	a	mixed	approach.	The	costs	of	the	PPP	include	 not	 only	 the	 implementation	 or	 service	 costs	 (depending	 on	 the	 PPP	 type),	 but	 also	transaction	costs	and	the	costs	of	paying	the	bribe,	as	well	as	additional	costs	from	the	discovery	of	corruption	(punishment	costs,	e.g.	loss	of	reputation	or	the	penalty	multiplied	by	the	probability	of	discovery).	The	incentive	for	corruption	is	given	when	the	revenues	outperform	the	costs.	Hence,	corruption	 is	 likely	 when	 under	 corruption	 the	 cash	 flow	 from	 the	 project	 is	 higher	 or	 the	implementation-	or	service	costs	may	be	lower	(e.g.	due	to	reduced	quality	standards,	overpricing	of	the	users	or	underinvestment).	The	revenue	stream	as	well	as	the	costs	related	to	corruption	are	endogeneous	to	the	respective	project,	 even	 if	 they	may	 differ	 substantially	 amongst	 projects,	 depending	 on	 the	 PPP-type,	 the	specific	contract	design	as	well	as	the	financial	size	of	the	project,	while	the	probability	of	being	caught	is	exogeneous	to	the	specific	project.	Table	 one	 summarizes	 the	 characteristics	 of	 PPPs	 that	 may	 be	 relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	corruption	 and	 are	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 multi-level	 characteristics	 of	 implementation	 and	execution,	the	somewhat	discretionarily	decided	incomplete	contract	they	are	based	on,	as	well	as	the	inherent	multi-step	or	life-cycle	concept.	 Table	1	
PPP	CHARACTERISTICS	AND	CORRUPTION	
 	 pre-level	 ex	ante	 ex	post	
Subject		 Political	level	 Administration	 Administration	























Incomplete	contracts	and	transaction	costs	PPPs	typically	emerge	in	a	context	of	incomplete	information	and	uncertainty,	contracts	will	–	necessarily	–	be	incomplete	(Budäus	and	Grüb	2007;	Parker	und	Hartley	2005).	The	physical	nature	of	 the	 network,	 uncertainty	 regarding	 future	 use	 as	 well	 as	 the	 likelihood	 of	 specific	 external	“shocks”	remain	unclear	at	the	time	the	contract	is	fixed.	Even	if	contingent	clauses	can	be	applied,	their	use	imposes	requirements	–	possibly	realized	events	have	to	be	anticipated,	described	and	verified	–	that	are	not	easy	to	fulfil	(Iossa	and	Martimort	2014).	All	measures,	undertaken	by	one	or	both	 contract	 parties	 to	 overcome	 that	 incompleteness	 “give	 rise	 to	 correspondingly	 high	transaction	costs”	(Dudkin	und	Välilä	2005).	With	a	view	on	the	transaction	cost	theory,	developed	by	Coase	(1937)	and	Williamson	(1975/1985),	transactions	–	such	as	the	transfer	of	property	rights	–	can	never	be	realized	free	of	cost	(Richter	and	Furubotn	1999).	Transaction	costs	therefore	are	all	costs	which	occur	 in	 the	context	of	contract	 formation,	monitoring	or	enforcement,	 including	
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information	costs	and	the	costs	of	the	creation	of	 institutions	necessary	for	contract	supervision	(Blum	et	al.	2005).	These	costs,	arising	from	the	incompleteness	of	the	contract,	increase	the	total	costs	of	the	deal.	They	are	of	specific	importance	when	opportunistic	behavior	–	“the	incomplete	or	distorted	 disclosure	 of	 information,	 especially	 the	 calculated	 effort	 to	mislead,	 distort,	 disguise,	obfuscate	or	otherwise	confuse”	(Williamson	1985)	–	is	to	be	expected,	which	also	must	be	taken	care	of	in	the	contract	(see	e.g.	Erlei	et	al.	2007).	The	exploitation	of	information	asymmetry	can	also	be	categorized	as	opportunistic	behavior	–	with	the	danger	of	opportunism	increasing	with	asset	specificity	(Reeves	2008).	These	costs	occur	at	each	stage	of	the	PPP;	corruption	can	therefore	be	helpful	to	reduce	these	costs	–	for	the	private,	but	also	for	the	public	partner:	successful	corruption	creates	a	kind	of	hold-up	situation	to	the	disadvantage	of	the	public	partner,	as	–	in	the	sense	of	modern	national	states’	enabling	and	guarantor	role	in	the	provision	of	services	–	the	public	employee	is	tied	to	the	private	enterprise.	As	a	consequence,	and	knowing	that	any	service	interruption	will	result	in	additional	problems,	the	incentive	to	make	concessions	can	be	assumed	to	be	higher	than	in	other	contractual	arrangements.	In	addition,	through	upstream-corruption	potential	problems	in	the	future	can	be	smoothened	–	a	fact	which	also	becomes	relevant	if	the	tender	process	itself	was	completed	without	corruption,	as	for	future	projects,	contract	renewals	or	re-negotiations	the	RoI	may	be	high	enough.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 also	 for	 the	public	partner	 corruption	may	be	useful	 as	 –	being	 tied	 together	through	corruption	–	the	public	partner’s	risk	of	becoming	a	victim	of	later	re-negotiations	may	be	lowered.	
Multi-level	characteristics	Even	if	many	scientific	studies	tackle	the	pre-level,	the	political	decision	in	favor	of	a	PPP,	or	the	level	ex	ante	to	the	implementation	of	the	PPP,	the	tender	process	itself,	the	post-tender	stage	has	been	widely	ignored	so	far,	as	well	as	the	potential	problems	arising	from	the	PPP-inherent	multi-level	characteristics	(Iossa	and	Martimort	2011).		At	the	first,	the	pre-decision	level,	politicians	decide	to	turn	a	specific	infrastructure	project	into	a	PPP.	As	evidence	demonstrates	that	in	general	corruption	may	lead	to	misallocation	of	resources,	e.g.	 in	 favor	of	sectors	with	a	higher	potential	 to	be	“bribe-generating”,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	same	effect	may	take	place	in	the	context	of	PPPs	(Liu	and	Mikesell	2014).	From	the	firm’s	viewpoint,	corruption	in	this	first	stage	of	the	PPP-process	is	characterized	by	a	high	risk,	while	the	outcome	remains	insecure.	Caused	by	the	multi-level	characteristics	of	PPPs,	even	if	the	respective	political	decision	has	been	(successfully)	influenced	in	favor	of	the	PPP-alternative,	there	is	no	certainty	that	the	enterprise	itself	will	be	the	private	partner	in	the	project.	Nonetheless,	corruption	at	this	level	may	be	useful	from	the	firm’s	viewpoint	if	the	expected	benefit	is	high	enough	(in	particular	multi-step	PPPs	with	a	large	financial	volume	that	include	operation	and	ownership	may	be	affected	here,	similar	to	experience	from	sheer	privatization	projects,	see	e.g.	Sclar	2000;	Savas	2000).	As	for	all	kinds	of	PPPs,	the	tender	process	is	of	pivotal	relevance,	with	being	quite	similar	to	more	general	 forms	of	public	procurement	 (and	 therefore	extensively	covered	by	 literature,	e.g.	Sclar	2000;	Savas	2000;	Iossa	and	Martimort	2011).	As	delineated	above,	in	the	ex	ante	and	ex	post	stage,	 the	 administration	 is	 the	 decision-maker,	 implementing	 and	 managing	 PPPs,	 and	consequently	the	second	stage	with	regards	to	corruption.	Corrupt	behavior	can	take	place	at	this	stage	independently	of	previous	corruption	on	the	political	level,	even	if	there	may	be	an	amplifying	effect:	once	an	enterprise	paid	bribes	to	turn	a	specific	project	into	a	PPP,	the	misunderstanding	of	“sunk	costs”	may	lead	to	corruption	at	this	later	stage.		In	most	countries,	e.g.	in	the	member	states	of	the	EU,	formal	public	procurement	law	has	to	be	applied	before	a	PPP	can	be	established,	similar	to	other	forms	of	contracting	out.	In	the	European	Union,	several	directives	specify	the	relevant	marginal	values	for	application	of	tender	processes	in	infrastructure	 provision.	 Furthermore,	 the	 single	 member	 states	 regulate	 the	 tender	 and	contracting	procedure	on	their	own.	Consequently,	the	legislation	in	some	member	states	may	go	beyond	the	–	already	strict	–	European	regulations.	Nonetheless,	 the	general	question,	 if	PPPs	–	independent	of	the	design	in	terms	of	control	or	majority	–	can	be	implemented	without	a	tender	process	 remains	 controversial	 (see	 e.g	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 2005	 and	 2009;	 European	Commission	2005;	European	Parliament	and	Council	of	Europe	2004	and	2004a).	While	this	fact	
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contract	period	and	to	the	fact	that	most	PPP	contracts	have	to	be	renewed	after	the	first	contract	period	has	ended,	the	investment	in	corruption	will	ceteris	paribus	yield	a	high	RoI,	as	the	cash	flow	from	the	project	can	be	expected	 to	be	supranormal	 if	 the	conditions	of	 the	private	 firm	will	be	accepted	 by	 the	 public	 partner	 (Klitgaard	 2012;	Marques	 and	Berg	 2011).	Hence,	 following	 the	decision	logic	delineated	above,	for	the	private	enterprise	the	incentive	for	corruption	is	high.	Moreover,	the	longer	a	cooperation	lasts,	the	higher	the	risk	of	reciprocal	personal	advantage,	as	mutual	 trust	 and	 understanding	 grow	 over	 time	 (Bannenberg	 and	 Schaupensteiner	 2004;	 Sack	2004).	This	fact	is	of	relevance	as	reputation	and	trust	are	of	pivotal	importance	when	it	comes	to	the	reduction	of	transaction	costs	of	corruption	(Parker	und	Hartley	2005).	The	incentive	to	behave	opportunistically	will	be	 lower	over	time,	as	 the	gains	 from	trust	will	be	 increasing	successively	(Erlei,	Leschke,	and	Sauerland	2007).	The	longer	the	contract	lasts,	the	higher	the	probability	that	the	benefits	from	trust	will	exceed	the	benefits	from	opportunistic	behavior;	reputation	and	trust	become	a	kind	of	 social	 capital,	which	accumulates	with	 further	use;	Parker	and	Hartley	2005).	Therefore,	 the	 risk	 of	 treason	 decreases	 with	 the	 contractual	 period	 that	 has	 already	 past.	Accordingly,	the	likelihood	of	corruption	increases	in	long-term	cooperations,	as	the	individuals’	risk	 decreases	 –	 knowing	 the	 partner	 better,	 being	 bound	 by	 trust	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 to	give/take	the	bribe.	In	this	context,	in	particular	corruption	that	is	designed	to	assure	the	successful	re-contracting	 is	 of	 relevance:	 The	 payment	 occurs	 during	 the	 first	 contract	 period,	 while	 the	benefits	materialize	in	the	second	period.	Additionally,	corruption	to	enforce	re-negotiations	of	the	contract	in	favor	of	the	private	enterprise	during	the	contract	period	are	to	be	expected	at	this	point,	e.g.	with	a	view	to	an	increase	of	tariff	rates	or	a	decrease	of	quality	standards.	This	may	especially	be	the	case	in	markets	which	are	characterized	by	intense	competition,	where	the	initial	bidding	has	to	be	low	in	terms	of	fees	or	tariffs.	





status	quo	ante.	Corruption	may	be	amongst	all	 the	most	challenging,	but	only	marginally	noted	factors	in	this	context.		Several	factors	can	be	identified	that	help	to	control	corruption	–	based	on	Becker	and	Stigler	(1974),	 the	 proper	 combination	 of	 monitoring	 and	 punishments.	 They	 tackle	 the	 exogeneous	dimension,	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 exposure,	 not	 the	 project-inherent	 dimension	 of	 direct	corruption	costs	or	revenues.	Increased	transparency,	regardless	of	whether	it	is	enforced	due	to	changes	in	the	legal	framework,	or	due	to	public	attention,	is	one	crucial	issue	in	this	context.	This	applies	to	both	levels,	the	political	as	well	as	the	administrative	level.	Decreasing	the	“discretion	of	contracting	 authorities	 by	making	 greater	 use	 of	 centrally	 determined	 guidelines	 on	 contracts”	(Iossa	and	Martimort	2014)	also	may	reduce	corruption	at	the	ex	ante	and	ex	post	level,	as	well	as	audit	based	on	performance,	specific	whistle-blower	programs	or	job	rotations	and	the	broad	use	of	the	“four	eyes	principle”.	Quite	 similar	effects	 can	be	 induced	by	an	 increase	of	 the	costs	of	 corruption	 through	higher	penalties	(for	public	as	well	as	private	actors)	if	a	corrupt	practice	is	discovered	–	both	with	respect	to	penalties	and	imprisonment.	Also	payments	schemes	for	the	public	administration	matter	in	this	context:	If	life-long	career	systems	in	the	public	sector	are	no	longer	existent	or	obtaining	lifelong	employment	becomes	unlikely	for	the	individual	in	a	specific	position,	the	risk	of	corruption	will	be	substantially	higher	compared	to	the	status	quo	ante.		Overall,	the	specific	vulnerability	for	corruption	can	be	seen	as	inherent	to	the	PPP	system,	and	is	therefore	not	easy	to	erase.	The	proposed	measures	to	reduce	the	risk	of	corruption	in	the	context	of	PPP	implementation	therefore	can	never	eliminate	corruption	totally,	but	can	increase	the	costs	of	corruption	and/or	lower	its	benefits;	they	might	therefore	reduce	it	in	the	long	run,	starting	by	changing	the	parameters	of	decision-making	of	individuals.		
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Німеччині	Після	 Другої	 Світової	 Війни,	 в	 перший	половині	40-х	років	відповідальні	особи	дали	початок	 новій	 концепції	 уряду	 для	 західної	частини	Німеччини.	Тим	часом,	було	створено	або	 перетворено	 декілька	 німецьких	федеральних	 земель.	 Головною	 метою	Парламентської	 Ради	 була	 побудова	федеральної	 системи	 Західної	 Німеччини.	Базовий	 Закон	 Федеральної	 Республіки	Німеччина	 (БЗФРН)	 вступив	 в	 дію	 23	 травня	1949	 року.	 Ідея	 полягала	 у	 запровадженні	дворівневої	 політико-адміністративної	системи	 прийняття	 рішень,	 яка	 закріплює	
